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brief in brief
• The Affordable Care Act calls for significant cuts in reimbursements to insurers

By Amanda Starc

providing Medicare Advantage (MA) cover-

Medicare, the federal health insurance program for elderly
Americans, covers 52 million people in the United States.1
Because health care spending has increased dramatically since
the program’s inception in 1965, the program has a large and
growing impact on the federal budget.

age, which has been the most popular
alternative to traditional fee-for-service
Medicare.
• Opponents of these cuts argue that they
carry serious negative repercussions for
seniors, and have lobbied successfully
to force their postponement.  
• But research coming out of the Wharton
School suggests that cuts to MA reim-

As baby boomers retire, both the number
of enrollees and the costs are expected
to rise. The Congressional Budget Office
(CBO) estimates that Medicare spending
will increase to 4.9% of GDP in 2038, a
63% jump from 2013.2 While spending has
slowed over the last few years, the Medicare
program represents an increasing strain on
the federal budget. Especially in the wake of
the Affordable Care Act (ACA), the need to
cut costs and develop innovative financing is
more important than ever.
Medicare Advantage (MA) has been
the most popular alternative to traditional
fee-for-service (FFS) financing in the program’s nearly 50 year history. In traditional
FFS Medicare, the federal government
pays hospitals and physicians directly for
services. Under MA, the federal government

pays private carriers on a per-member, permonth basis to insure Medicare beneficiaries, who enroll voluntarily. Insurers have
been able to attract consumers by adding a
variety of benefits and lowering consumers’
share of the costs, compared with traditional
Medicare fees. However, critics contend that
the MA program actually costs the federal
government more than traditional Medicare,
because MA enrollees tend to be healthier
than average and therefore would rack up
much lower costs if enrolled in FFS.
The ACA calls for cuts in reimbursements to insurers providing MA coverage
that would save the federal government
$156 billion over the next nine years.3 This
issue brief examines the potential impact of
those cuts.

bursements actually are unlikely to harm
consumer welfare.
• The research indicates that higher MA
reimbursements do not translate into
less expensive or higher quality care for
consumers.  But they do benefit insurance
firms, which see higher profits, some of
which they channel into increased advertising to encourage more people to enroll
in the MA plans they offer.
• While lower reimbursements likely would
reduce insurance firm profitability, they
would substantially improve the federal
budget—without negatively impacting
the quality of care received by patients.

MEDICARE ADVANTAGE VS.
TRADITIONAL MEDICARE
MA plans, originally known as Medicare
Part C plans, were created in the 1980s as a
way to introduce to the Medicare program
the choice, competition, and innovation
typically associated with health maintenance organizations (HMOs).4 Since then,
MA has been subject to changing regulations and reimbursement rates relative to
traditional Medicare. Perhaps as a result,
the program’s popularity has fluctuated over
time and across the country. Figure 1 shows
the percentage of the Medicare population
that purchased MA plans, also called MA
penetration rates, from 1999 to the present.
The program covered 13% of Medicare
beneficiaries in 2005 and 28% of Medicare enrollees in 2013. Similarly, Figure 2
shows MA participation by state for 2013:
for example, the program covered 39% of
Medicare beneficiaries in Pennsylvania
but only 16% of Medicare beneficiaries in
neighboring New Jersey.
Typically, firms attract consumers by
offering more comprehensive coverage than
traditional Medicare provides. For example,
traditional Medicare exposes beneficiaries to substantial cost-sharing, including
a $1216 deductible for Part A (hospital)
services in 2013 and 20% coinsurance for
Part B (physician) services, without an
out-of-pocket maximum. As a result, most
Medicare beneficiaries buy some form of
supplemental or additional health insurance,
either through a former employer or from
the individual market. MA is an example
of a type of policy sold on the individual
market (Medigap is another). In addition to
offering lower cost-sharing, MA plans may
also offer dental, vision, or drug coverage;
the latter was especially valuable before the
Medicare Part D program went into effect
in 2006.
On average, MA can be a very good
financial deal for consumers. For example,
the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid
1

http://kff.org/medicare/fact-sheet/medicare-advantagefact-sheet/

2

http://www.cbo.gov/publication/44582

3

http://www.cbo.gov/publication/43471

4

http://kff.org/medicare/fact-sheet/medicare-advantagefact-sheet/
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Keystone 65 HMO; figures obtained from the Medicare
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But for many consumers, this is a reasonable
tradeoff. A number of the large, national
insurers offer MA plans. United Healthcare
sold 21% of total plans across the country
in 2013; Blue Cross Blue Shield affiliates
and Humana also had substantial national
market share.6 Marketing, both directly to
consumers and through agents and brokers,
plays a potentially important role in driving
market share. There is also some evidence
that advertising may be used to attract
healthier than average consumers.7
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While MA may substantially reduce
financial risk for many Medicare beneficiaries, there is some concern over the
choices available to consumers. The market
is largely controlled by a small number of

total medicare private health plan enrollment, 1999-2014

Compare tool
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DOES THE ADDITIONAL COST
OF MEDICARE ADVANTAGE
BENEFIT CONSUMERS?

Services (CMS) estimates that an Independence Blue Cross plan5 in Philadelphia
County has a total yearly out-of-pocket
cost – the amount the average beneficiary
can expect to spend on medical care – of
$3,950, as compared to $6,180 in traditional
FFS Medicare. In exchange for lower costsharing, the MA beneficiary typically has
a narrower choice of doctors and hospitals.

9

insurers who advertise extensively and may
attempt to select healthier than average
beneficiaries. Insurers certainly have an
incentive to select such beneficiaries, since
the federal government pays insurers on a
per member, per month basis, rather than
reimbursing for the actual expenses that
members incur for medical services.
To reduce costs, the ACA has
proposed large cuts to insurer reimbursements, which the insurance industry has
successfully protested. This raises a natural
question: How much does additional

http://www.u.arizona.edu/~nosal/MA_switching_6_12.
pdf

Figure 2:

share of medicare beneficiaries enrolled in medicare advantage plans,
by state, 2014
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money spent on MA reimbursements
benefit consumers?
More money for firms does not necessarily improve the cost of plans or the
quality of coverage for the public, according
to recent research I co-authored with Mark
Duggan and Boris Vabson from the Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania. Our paper, titled “Who Benefits When

the Government Pays More? Evidence from
Medicare Advantage,” does find that higher
reimbursement increases both patient
enrollment and the number of insurance
companies in the market. These increases
benefit insurers more than consumers.
We examine a concept called economic
incidence—essentially, measuring who (i.e.,
the supplier or the consumer) truly pays a

tax or benefits from a subsidy. To measure
the economic incidence of MA reimbursements, we look across geographic areas with
higher or lower payments—called benchmarks—to insurers. The benchmark is the
basis for the average payment per member,
per month. Benchmarks reflect both the
costs of traditional Medicare, which are
likely to be correlated with demand for
MA, and regulation. In order to establish
causation, rather than just correlation, we
use unique regulation in the MA market
known as payment floors. These are the
lowest amounts of reimbursement firms can
receive from the government for providing care, intended to spur private firms to
participate in the MA program. The government established two payment floors, one
for urban counties, which is approximately
10.5% higher than the one for rural counties. A county changes from rural to urban
when its associated metropolitan statistical area (MSA) goes from a population of
249,999 residents to 250,000. While the
average rural county is likely to be very different from the average urban county, those
that are close to either side of this population threshold are likely to be fairly similar.
These are the counties the study compares.
Figure 3 highlights rural and urban floors;
during the 2006-2011 time period of the
study, floor counties accounted for the
majority of U.S. counties.
As an example of how this threshold
works, consider two comparable Illinois
counties, Peoria and Sangamon, whose 2008
benchmarks were both set at the payment
floor. Peoria County belongs to the Peoria,
IL MSA with a population of 367,000,
while Sangamon County belongs to the
Springfield, IL MSA with a population of
just 204,000. As a result, although these
counties have similar per capita costs for
traditional Medicare FFS coverage ($601
for Peoria and $612 for Sangamon), the
county-level benchmark of what firms were
reimbursed in Peoria County was $772
per month—corresponding to the urban
floor rate—versus just $699 per month in
neighboring Sangamon county—the rural
floor rate.8
The study examines a number of related
questions. First, are insurers more likely

to voluntarily sell MA plans in the more
generously reimbursed urban floor counties
than in rural floor counties? The answer is
yes; on average, 1.9 additional firms enter
the market in urban floor counties, where
the benchmarks are higher. With more
firms, there is substantially lower market
concentration: there are more insurers competing for customers in urban floor counties.
Second, are more Medicare beneficiaries
enrolled in MA plans in counties with
higher reimbursements? Again, the answer
is yes; the MA participation rate nearly
doubles in urban floor counties, an increase
of 12 percentage points. For those who
believe that MA is either more cost effective
or a great deal for consumers on average,
this is a good thing.
In addition to the number of firms and
participants, the study examines prices. If,
for the most part, consumers benefit from
increased government spending on the MA
program, we should see consumer premiums
fall by about $73 per month—the increase
in the subsidy—in urban floor counties.
However, MA reimbursements from the
federal government are so high that many
firms charge no premium beyond what
beneficiaries pay for Medicare Part B. We
find little effect on premiums. Instead, firms
could reduce copayments or deductibles. The
Medicare program publishes estimated outof-pocket costs for each MA plan. If firms
reduce deductibles or copayments, the estimated out-of-pocket costs also fall. These
costs are $10 per month lower in urban floor
counties than in rural floor counties, but this
result is not statistically significant. While
this suggests that consumers receive some
benefit from higher government payments,
the part of the subsidy that passes through
to consumers is far from the full amount.
While we find little evidence that plans
are more generous in urban floor counties,
financial features are only one dimension of
insurance that a beneficiary may value. Consumers worry about access to doctors and
hospitals, which are affected by insurer networks. They also might care about administrative aspects of plans, such as the quality
of customer service or an insurer’s reputation. Finally, Medicare beneficiaries may
look for which MA plans can help them

manage their own health care effectively.
To examine these dimensions of plans,
the study looks at survey data from the
Consumer Assessment of Healthcare Providers and Systems (CAHPS), performed
by the Agency for Healthcare Research and
Quality (AHRQ). The CAHPS includes
survey data from about 160 thousand Medicare recipients each year.
Do consumers in urban counties like
their doctors more? No; quality ratings are
statistically the same between urban and
rural counties. Do consumers in urban floor
counties go to the doctor more often or
like their specialists more than consum-

“The research indicates that
an additional dollar of federal
spending on the MA program
translates into, at most, only
40 cents of additional financial
benefit for consumers.”

ers in rural floor counties? No again; the
estimates are statistically the same. Finally,
do consumers in urban floor counties report
that they are in better health? No again; the
results are statistically identical.
To summarize, the results show that
higher reimbursements lead to higher MA
participation rates, which explains some of
the variation across the country and over
time. More firms enter the market, thus the
market appears more competitive, but prices
do not fall substantially and quality does
not increase.
Consumers may not benefit from higher
reimbursements for a couple of reasons.
First, consumers in urban floor counties may
be sicker and more expensive to insure than
those in rural floor counties due to insurance companies being selective. However,
the research indicates that this is unlikely.
First, MA payments are adjusted for risk,
and enrollees look no more risky in urban
than in rural floor counties. Second, to
account for the results, new enrollees would

have to be about 30% more expensive to
insure, which seems unlikely.
If firms being selective cannot explain
these results, a lack of competition in the
market might. Insurers may be able to control prices in markets where they have an
advantage over competing firms. Theoretically, this would explain why plan generosity
does not increase. Two facts support this
argument. First, larger publicly traded insurers experienced abnormally high returns
when proposed cuts to the MA program
were delayed by the government. Second,
firms have advertised extensively, which
according to the study explains the increase
in MA enrollment in urban floor counties.
The results indicate that firms spend
on average about $5 more per Medicare
beneficiary for television spot advertising
in urban floor counties than in rural floor
counties. While this is not a large amount,
it is almost certainly underestimates the
total resources dedicated to plan marketing.
This can help explain why so many beneficiaries in urban floor counties choose MA
over traditional Medicare, even though the
plans themselves do not appear substantially
more generous.
The research indicates that an additional dollar of federal spending on the
MA program translates into, at most, only
40 cents of additional financial benefit for
consumers. Similarly, quality is unchanged,
yet advertising spending increases. This
has important implications for policy, and
the results should play into the decisions
regarding proposed cuts to the Medicare
Advantage program.

POLICY IMPLICATIONS
The ACA’s proposed cuts to the MA program are designed, in part, to fund insurance expansions in Medicaid and subsidized
exchange plans. Proponents of these cuts
argue that the program overpays insurers
relative to traditional Medicare. Critics argue that the cuts would have serious
negative repercussions for seniors, and have
organized advertising campaigns and lobbying efforts to postpone or even abandon
the cuts altogether. Indeed, a few weeks ago,
after facing substantial lobbying and politi-

cal pressure, CMS announced that rather
than cutting MA rates by 1.9% for 2015,
rates would increase by 0.4%.
Our findings indicate that cuts of up to
10% are unlikely to harm consumer welfare
by increasing premiums or out-of-pocket
costs or lowering the quality of care. By
contrast, cuts in MA reimbursements may
cause firms to advertise less and leave less
profitable markets, which could lead to
lower enrollment in MA plans.
While each dollar spent by the government on MA may not greatly improve
the value for Medicare beneficiaries, those
dollars spent on MA can lower the average consumer costs when measured against
traditional Medicare. The mere fact that
consumers are more likely to choose MA

plans implies that they prefer them to traditional Medicare. Therefore, policy makers
might be concerned that cuts could result
in declining enrollment. However, a great
deal of evidence suggests that consumers
will stick with what they know or what they
have done in the past,9 which may mean less
of an impact on reducing enrollment.
Ultimately, the study predicts that
lower reimbursements are likely to reduce
insurance firm profitability but improve the
federal budget. Lower reimbursement rates
are likely to save the federal government
money in two ways. Obviously, lower reimbursements mean beneficiaries enrolled in
MA cost less. Furthermore, assuming MA is
more expensive than traditional FFS, lower
enrollment in MA would reduce the overall

costs of the program.
More broadly, the MA program highlights a critical issue facing policy makers
and practitioners in a post-health reform
world. As the United States builds on its
existing private insurance system with
publicly financed subsidies and increasing
regulation, the government must set rules
that encourage private insurers to participate while reducing the burden on taxpayers. Similarly, practitioners must find a way
to create value in an evolving marketplace.
These challenges exist not only in the
Medicare program, but in the newly formed
health insurance marketplaces as well.
Continuing dialogue among practitioners,
academics, and policymakers should spur
future research and better policy in this area.
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